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THE SCOPE OF CONsTrrTONAL GuARANTIEs OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Americans have long been fortunate in that their basic constitu-
tional rights have not been the subject of any wide-spread or concerted
attack. For this reason, they feel secure in the enjoyment of their free-
dom. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion,
freedom from unlawful searches, and other liberties are taken for
granted. Yet the rise of Nazi Germany stands as a lesson for all that the
securing of freedom is never a guaranty of its permanence. The hard-
won independence of the small countries of Europe vanished in a mat-
ter of days or even hours before the onrushing German armies. History
has demonstrated again and again that freedom cannot be secured
to the world merely by incorporating its principles into a treaty. No
more can domestic liberties be made perpetual by the drafting of corl-
stitutions and constitutional amendments. Freedom must ever be the
subject of constant vigilance or it will be lost. Americans must put
aside their sense of security and examine the bases of their own rights,
lest constitutional guaranties become mere empty phrases.
No better preface to a review of the present status of our constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights can be found than the pointed observation
of the late Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficient.
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasions of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to lib-
erty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-mean-
ing but without understanding."'
A late case before the Virginia courts presents an example of just such
an "insidious encroachment" as Justice Brandeis must have had in
mind. Two boys were found guilty of throwing stones against a dwell-
ing in the night time; Separate judgments were entered declaring each
to be a delinquent. In each judgment seven conditions of probation
were imposed, depriving the boy of certain normal privileges and rights
for one year. One of these ordered that each boy "attend Sunday school
and Church each Sunday hereafter for a period of one year, and pre-
sent satisfactory evidence of such attendance at the conclusion of each
'Olmstead v. United States, 227 U. S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. ed. 944
(1928).
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month to the Probation Officer." Appeals were taken to the Corpora-
tion Court of Bristol, where the judgments of the Juvenile and Domes-
tic Relations Court were affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals re-
versed the judgments and dismissed the proceedings against each of
the defendants on the ground that the judgments were contrary to the
evidence and that the conditions of probation violated the constitu-
tional rights of the defendants in that it required them to attend
worship against their will. 2 Although such a decision may seem a
rather obvious one in Virginia in the light of the State's Constitution3
and Statute of Religious Freedom,4 it nevertheless is fairly represen-
tative of the more recent approach to such issues both in other state
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The issue of religious freedom has been involved in a far greater
number of cases than most Americans probably expect. It would seem
that the scope of this liberty is not yet defined, but can still present
problems of interpretation. In some of the cases the "religious" aspect
is so far-fetched as to make obvious the danger that opponents of
varied sorts of restrictive governmental regulations are ready and will-
ing to attack them in the cause of religion.5 However, the majority
of the cases turn on the legitimate point of just how much liberty the
courts are willing to accord individuals in the name of religious free-
dom. Most of these decisions can be grouped into a few rather logical
categories.
The right of an individual to worship according to the dictates of
his conscience is protected by three separate guaranties: the First
2Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S. E. (2d) 444 (946).
Va. Const. (1902) Art. I, § 16: "That religion or the duty which we owe to our
creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and con-
viction, not by force or violence and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience and that it is the
mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each
other."
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 34. This statute, written by Thomas Jefferson,
was adopted by Virginia in 1785 and has formed a part of the Virginia Code since
that date. It has been the model for similar statutes in many other states.
'State v. Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 5o N. E. 900, 41 L. R. A. 854 (1898). A statute
prohibiting playing of baseball on Sunday neither requires nor prohibits any re-
ligious observance and therefore does not violate the Ohio constitutional guarantee
of freedom of conscience in matters of religion. People v. Goldberger, 163 N. Y. S.
663 (ig96). A statute making it a penal offense fraudulently to mark meat as
"kosher" is not an invasion of religious freedom. People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163
N. Y. S. 682 (1917). A penal law making it an offense to sell an article for the pre-
vention of conception is not invalid as infringing inherent right of freedom of
conscience.
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Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the individual
state constitutional provisions, and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. The latter, however, has not been recognized
as encompassing religious freedom until a relatively recent time.6 Prior
to such recognition, the First Amendment was a guaranty solely against
encroachments by acts of Congress. The majority of cases involved
regulatory measures of state governmental agencies and so arose under
the individual state constitutions. It was believed that the states were
in no wise limited in their power to regulate religion except in so far
as their individual state constitutions provided restrictions.7 But as
soon as the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against state gov-
ernmental action was extended to cover those rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment, the number of decisions rendered by the United
States Supreme Court multiplied.
One group of cases arose in the federal courts in the period prior
to the case of Gitlow v. New York,8 the decision of which extended the
coverage of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases arose under the
First Amendment in that the constitutionality of certain United States
statutes prohibiting polygamy in territory under the exclusive control
of the United States was in issue. The Supreme Court consistently de-
nied that such a prohibition violated the constitutional guaranties of
-religious liberty. Running through these cases is the suggestion that
such a statute does in fact restrict religious freedom, but that public
policy could not permit the objection to stand.9 Such cases no longer
6As late as x9o7, Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "We leave undecided the question-
whether there is to be found in the 14th Amendment a prohibition similar to that
in the 1st." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 S. Ct. 556, 558, 51 L. ed.
878 (19o7). But in 1925 the Supreme Court finally reached the conclusion that the
rights guaranteed from abridgment by Congress under the ist Amendment are
among the fundamental rights protected by the due process clause of the 14 th
Amendment from impairment by the state. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652,
666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 630, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925). Though this case dealt only with free-
dom of speech and of the press, it has been assumed that the same principle applies
with equal force to freedom of religion and the other liberties guaranteed in the
various clauses of the first amendment. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586, 593, 6o S. Ct. 1oo, 1o12, 84 L. ed. 1375, 127 A. L. R. 1493, 1495 (1940).
7Swafford v. Keaton, 23 Ga. App. 238, 98 S. E. 122 (1919); State v. Mockus, 120
Me. 841, 113 Ad. 39, 14 A. L. R. 871 (1921).
8268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
OReynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 167, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878): "To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto him-
self. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances." And again
in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 300, 33 L. ed. 637 (1889): "It was
NOTES-19461
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arise, and undoubtedly the unanimous stand taken by the courts aided
in achieving their disappearance. However, these cases do serve to, il-
lustrate one practical limitation to any concept of absolute religious
freedom-that religious freedom cannot be asserted as a justification
for the commission of the traditional criminal offenses. As one pro-
ceeds to cases which involve conduct differing from the normal, but
still falling short of such conduct as would tend to produce any real
and present threat to public order or morals, it becomes increasingly
difficult to define limitations and maintain any continuity of reasoning.
The so-called "flag-salute" cases aroused much interest and comment
during the war period. These cases arose because of the refusal of a
religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag, on the
ground that such a ceremony violates the scriptural prohibitions
against the serving of false gods. Five cases in all reached the Supreme
Court prior to 194o, but the most widely heralded of these was Miners-
ville School District v. Gobitis, decided in that year.1o Eight members
of the Court decided that a requirement of a local board of education
in Pennsylvania that pupils salute the American flag in daily school
exercises did not violate the due process clause as applied to children
who sought to avoid the exercises as an encroachment Pn their re-
ligious beliefs. The Court recognized that extensive leeway should be
given religious beliefs but that this license could not be carried to the
extent of excusing a citizen from the discharge of political responsibil-
ities. Mr. Justice Stone was the sole member dissenting from this
opinion.
Assuming that absolute religious freedom is intolerable and that
limitations must be placed somewhere, this decision might well be
regarded as the logical demarcation of religious and political spheres-
a rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Even the Je-
hovah's Witnesses, taking a literal interpretation of the Bible, admit
the necessity of some forms of political conformity such as the pay-
ment of certain types of taxes. But on closer inspection it becomes ap-
parent that the decision might open the door to a possible reconsidera-
tion on the question of exemption from military service because of
conscientious objection.
This decision was not destined long to remain the law of the land.
never intended or supposed that the Amendment could be invoked as a protection
against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and
morals of society."
10o U.S. 586, 6o S. Ct. 1oo, 84 L. ed. 1375, 127 A. L. R. 1493 (1940).
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Following in its wake came a host of state statutes requiring compul-
sory flag salute exercises in the public schools. Jehovah's Witnesses are
not easily discouraged, and although they denounce all government
as an instrumentality of Satan, they are not hesitant about looking to
the courts of that government for possible relief. They fought each
case which arose against them with the result that within two years,
three members of the Supreme Court announced that they had been
in error in the Gobitis case." As was to be expected after such a change
of heart, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,12 which arose the follow-
ing year. In reversing the previous holding of the Gobitis case, Mr.
Justice Jackson pointed out that the decision had assumed that power
exists in the State to impose the flag salute discipline upon school chil-
dren in general. The Court had merely examined and rejected a claim
of an immunity from the unquestioned general rule, an immunity
based on religious beliefs. The very core of the Gobitis decision is the
reasoning that "national unity is the basis of national security" and
that the authorities have "the right to select appropriate means for
its attainment." In the Barnette case, Mr. Justice Jackson questioned
the existence of this alleged power of the State to compel outward
manifestations of the desired inward inclinations, and concluded that
such power does not in fact exist, and that such exercise of authority
transcends the constitutional limitations which are desig-ned to protect
the intellect and spirit from official control.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was not dissuaded from the position he
assumed when he delivered the majority opinion in the Gobitis case.
In a very lengthy dissent he advanced the belief that the Barnette de-
cision was more far-reaching than the majority ever intended; that the
Court was in fact passing judgment on the political power of each of
"This change of opinion occurred in conjunction with the case of Jones v.
Opelika, 16 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. ed. 1691 (1942). The majority of the
Court in this case held that a non-discriminatory license fee required of all people
distributing pamphlets on the city streets was not an infringement of the consti-
tutionally guaranteed freedom of religion. In a dissenting opinion, Justices Murphy,
Douglas, and Black stated: "The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in
our opinion suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced
by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction which Minersville
School District v. Gobitis... took against the same religious minority, and is a
logical extension of the principles upon which that decision rested. Since we
joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion
to state that we now believe that it was also wrongly decided." 316 U. S. 584, 633,
62 S. Ct. 1231, 1251 (1942).
12319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. ed. z628 (1943).
1946]
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the forty-eight states.18 Furthermore, he refused to accept the distinc-
tion drawn between this situation and that involved in Hamilton v.
Regents 4 in which the Court had unanimously held that a student at-
tending a state-maintained university cannot refuse to attend required
courses in military training because of religious scruples. The majority
distinguished the cases on the ground that attendance at a university
is purely voluntary, whereas public school attendance is compulsory.
Frankfurter took issue with the majority's assertion that attendance
in the public schools is compulsory, pointing out that under an earlier
rule handed down by the Supreme Court, West Virginia cannot com-
pel children to attend its public schools.'5 He believed that just as the
right of California was recognized in Hamilton v. Regents'6 to pro-
vide for future soldiers through compulsory military training in the
state university, so West Virginia should be accorded the right to de-
velop future citizens by requiring flag saluting exercises in its public
schools.
In concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas "substantially"
agreed with the majority as represented by Mr. Justice Jackson, but
they stressed the point that this decision should not be interpreted as
a blanket withdrawal of all restrictions and limitations on the exercise
of religious freedom.' 7
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy expressed
a belief that religious freedom should be upheld to "its farthest
13"When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this court, wrote that 'it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts,' he went to the very essence
of our constitutional system and the democratic conception of our society. He did
not mean that for only some phases of civil government this Court was not to sup-
plant legislatures and sit in judgment upon the right or wrong of a challenged
measure. He was stating the comprehensive judicial duty and role of this Court in
our constitutional scheme...."
"....Judges should be very diffident in setting their judgment against that
of a state in determining what is and what is not a major concern, what means
are appropriate to proper ends, and what is the total social cost in striking a bal-
ance of imponderables." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624, 649, 652, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 119o, 1192, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1943).
1293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343 (1934).
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. io7o, 39
A. L. R. 468 (1925). An oregon statute requiring all children to attend public schools
was held to violate Fourteenth Amendment rights (1) of parents and children to
select their own schools, and (2) of private schools not to have the value of their
property destroyed without due process of law.
"293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343 (1934).
""No well-ordered society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to
make final decisions, unassailable by the State, as to everything they will or will
[Vol. IV
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reaches."18 This latter is the opinion of but one man; however, as can
be seen from this and other recent cases, it marks the trend of thought
of the present Supreme Court.
Closely paralleling the "flag-salute" cases has been another group
of cases in which these same Jehovah's Witnesses have challenged
the constitutionality of certain municipally-imposed vendor's taxes,
licenses, and permits as constituting an infringement of their freedom
of religion. Beginning in 1938, with Lovell v. City of Griffin,19 the
question of the validity of such ordinances has been repeatedly before
the Supreme Court. There was considerable variation in the subject
matter and wording of the ordinances involved in each of these cases,
but up until 1940, when the flag-salute rule was upheld in the Gobitis
case, the Supreme Court uniformly held such restrictive measures to
be unconstitutional.20 The temper of the Court of 194o was evidenced
in another case, Cox v. New Hampshire,2 ' where a statute which re-
quired a permit to be secured before a parade could be staged was up-
held. Seemingly inconsistent holdings which had been made prior to
that time were distinguished on the ground that this statute did not
give the city an arbitrary right to refuse permits for a parade. The
previous cases had been held by the Supreme Court to involve arbitrary
censorship. This was the first of the line of cases which might be re-
garded as a backward step from the direction of absolute religious
freedom.
not do. The First Amendment does not go so far. Religious faiths, honestly held, do
not free individuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws
which are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave
and pressingly imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibition, mere-
ly regulate time, place or manner of religious activity." West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 643, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1188, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1943)-
w'There is before us the right of freedom to believe, freedom to worship one's
Maker according to the dictates of one's conscience, a right which the Constitution
specifically shelters. Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier
duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches."
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 645, 63 S. Ct.
1178, 1188, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1943).
D303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
"Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 44, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938). A
statute required written permission from the city manager to sell or distribute with-
out cost literature of any kind. This was held unconstitutional in that it subjected
such distribution to license and censorship. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147,
6o S. Ct. 146, 84 L. ed. 155 (1939). Four cases were tried together. Three involved
statutes prohibiting absolutely the distribution of pamphlets. One prohibited throw-
ing papers on the streets. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to prohibit
such distribution and that although the city had the power to prevent the littering
of its streets, such power could only be invoked against those who actually threw
1946]
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The next important case was that of Jones v. Opelika, decided in
June, 1942,22 which involved an ordinance requiring a license to sell
pamphlets on the streets. The Court considered only the question of
whether or not the license was discriminatory, and finding it not to be
discriminatory, held it valid. Chief Justice Stone dissented and was
joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and Douglas. It was here that the
last three justices took the opportunity to express the opinion that
the Gobitis case had been erroneously decided. Like the Gobitis case,
this decision stood only a very short time. In May, 1943, the Court
handed down thirteen decisions involving the Jehovah's Witnesses.
One of these, Murdock v. Pennsylvania,23 presented the same factual
situation as Jones v. Opelika, and the Court decided that the tax was
unconstitutional, overruling the Jones case. It was reasoned that the
power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress it.
The Court did not stop here. In Follett v. Town of McCormick,24
a distributor of Jehovah's Witnesses' literature was held to be immune
from an occupational license fee, admittedly non-discriminatory, even
though his livelihood was derived entirely from such sales. Again, in
Marsh v. State of Alabama,25 the Court exceeded previous bounds and
held it unconstitutional for an industrial town, owned entirely by a
corporation, to attempt to exact a license fee for the distribution of
religious tracts. The reasoning is summed up in the observation that
"When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property
against those of people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we
must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a pre-
ferred position."
26
A minority of the Court, Mr. Justice Reed in particular, expressed
alarm over the trend of these more recent cases. The majority decisions
are interpreted as conferring an almost absolute immunity from tax-
papers on the streets and could not be invoked against those who merely provided
the wherewithal. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 31o U. S. 296, 6o S. Ct. 9oo, 84 L. ed. 987
(1940). A statute required an official to pass upon the question of whether a given
cause was religious in purpose as a condition to the issuance of a certificate of ap-
proval to solicit for a religious cause. The Court held that it violated the con-
situation in that it imposed censorship upon religious activity.
2312 U. S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. ed. 1o49 (194o).
22316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. ed. 16gi (1942).
1319 U. S. 1o5, 63 S. Ct. 87 o , 87 L. ed. 1292 (1943).
"321 U. S. 573, 64 S. Ct. 717, 88 L. ed. 938 (1944).
23326 U. S. 5o, 66 S. Ct. 276, 9 L. ed. 237 (1946).
24326 U. S. 5o, 66 S. Ct. 276, 28o, go L. ed. 237 (1946).
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ation on the Jehovah's Witnesses. Minority justices are unable to see
how the same immunity can be denied to newspapers and radio sta-
tions on the ground that such taxation constitutes an infringement of
the freedom of speech and of the press. Furthermore, they regard these
cases as rendering property owners almost powerless to prevent un-
wanted trespassers from plaguing them in the name of religious free-
dom. Whether or not the fears of this minority are well founded re-
mains to be seen.
A fourth group of cases is closely related to the "flag-salute" de-
cisions in that they also involve the issue of religious freedom in the
public schools. These cases, however, have been confined exclusively
to the state courts. They involve the issue of whether the reading of
the Bible in the public schools constitutes a violation of the individual
state constitutional guaranties of religious freedom. The states are
not in accord on this point. In at least five cases, the courts have held
that such exercises did not violate the constitution2 7 Other jurisdic-
dons take the opposite view, that such exercises violate their respective
constitutional prohibitions against the establishment of a state religion
and compulsory worship.28 With the exception of the Wisconsin de-
cision, these two groups can be reconciled on their facts: those cases
holding such exercises to violate the constitutions all involved statutes
which made no provision for the exemption of the children whose
parents made objections; but those cases holding it permissible to read
the Bible in the public schools, providing the teacher refrained from
making comment, all involved non-compulsory type statutes. How-
2People ex rel. Vollman v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 61o (1927) (Bible
reading is valid where the children whose parents object do not have to attend);
Wilkerson et al. v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 11o S. E. 895 (1922) (Bible reading in
schools valid where attendance is not compulsory); Moore v. Monroe and another,
64 Iowa 367, 2o N. W. 475 (1884) (Code section 1764 providing that "the Bible
shall not be excluded from any school or institution in the state, nor shall any pupil
be required to read it contrary to wishes of his parent or guardian," held not in vio-
lation of the constitution); Pfeiffer v. Board of Education of City of Detroit, 118
Mich. 56o, 77 N. W. 250 (1898) (Distinguished Weiss case on difference in consti-
tutional construction); Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virginia, 171
Minn. 142, 214 N. W. x8 (1927) (Requirement that the Bible be read in public
schools valid where the children are excused if their parents object).
"People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education of District 24, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N. E.
251 (191o) (Reading of the King James Version of the Bible held to be a discrimina-
tion against Catholics); Herold v. Parish Board of School Directors et al., 136 La.
io34, 68 So. 116 (1915) (Reading of the New Testament held to be a discrimination
against Jewish pupils); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N. W. 846
(1902); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School District No. 8, 76 Wis. 177,
44 N. W. 967 (1890).
x946]
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ever, in a case involving a statute which did not require attendance,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional on the
reasoning that each religious sect bases its doctrine on some portion
of the Bible and the reading of that portion would tend to inculcate
that doctrine. Moreover, the withdrawal of a portion of the students
at such time as the Bible was being read would tend to destroy the
equality and uniformity of treatment of pupils sought to be established
and protected by the constitution.
29
It is interesting to speculate whether the United States Supreme
Court would also strike down such statutes, in the light of its more
recent decisions extending the protection of religious freedom. An
answer to this question may eventually be presented in a test case
which began in the state courts of Illinois in the summer of 1945.80 A
petition was filed by the wife of a member of the faculty at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, asking for a writ of mandamus to compel the local
board of education to cease its present practice of requiring the read-
ing of parts of the Bible in public school exercises. Though the chil-
dren of objecting parents were specifically excused from the classes,
plaintiff alleged that such practice constitutes an infringment of the
constitutional rights of her child. The writ was denied in the Sixth
Circuit Court at Champaign, Illinois, and appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of Illinois, which has not yet rendered a decision.t The
results may prove significant in that plaintiff has declared her inten-
tion of appealing to the United States Supreme Court should she re-
ceive an adverse ruling in the highest court of Illinois.
There are two other cases which involve the issue of religious exer-
cises in schools, but they differ from the above in that one arose in a
state university and the other in a privately owned military school. In
North v. Trustees of University of Illinois,81 it was alleged that plaiii-
tiff's son was expelled because of his refusal to attend compulsory
chapel exercises. Mandamus was sought to compel the school authori-
ties to readmit the boy. In holding that mandamus would not lie, the
court held that this regulation did not infringe the Illinois constitu-
2State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School District No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 44
N. W. 967 (x89o).
"McCollum v. Board of Education (see Newsweek Magazine, July 2, 1945, P. 76,
and Sept. 24, 1945, p. 85; Time Magazine, Sept. 24, 1945, p. 66).
tOn 22 Jan. 1947, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision,
ruling that such voluntary classes, not part of the public school program nor sup-
ported by public money, do not encroach upon religious liberty. People ex rel Mc-
Collum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71, 15 U.. Law Week 2431.
R1357 in. 296, 27 N. E. 54 (1891).
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tion.32 The court based its decision in part on the voluntary nature of
enrollment in the university, and distinguished the Wisconsin case
previously noted in that it related to the public schools. This is the
same argument advanced by the United States Supreme Court in
Hamilton v. Regents previously noted, but that this line of reasoning
is not universally accepted is demonstrated by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in the Barnette case.33
The second case, Miami Military Institute v. Lef,3 4 arose over an
attempt on the part of the school to collect certain tuition fees from
the defendant. He had admittedly contracted to pay these fees, but
his son withdrew from school because he was being forced to go to
church each Sunday even though there was no church of his faith for
him to attend. The court held in part35 that such a requirement vio-
lated the student's constitutional rights in that it compelled him to
attend and support a place of worship contrary to his desires.
The only obvious conclusion that can be reached from a study of
these cases is that the final word on the allowable limitations to relig-
ious freedom remains to be spoken. It is apparent that the trend of the
recent cases toward greater freedom has been so rapid that a minority
of the Supreme Court have come to believe that the proper constitu-
tional limits have already been exceeded. The Supreme Court might
conceivably continue on its present course until it reaches an ultimate
conclusion that any form of restraint on absolute religious freedom
violates the Constitution. On the other hand, the recent appointment
of a new Chief Justice may conceivably upset the balance on the Court
and result in a retreat from the present position. Inasmuch as the
problem of religious liberty necessarily involves concepts and intan-
gible standards, it would seem that the decisions must inevitably con-
tinue to be influenced to a considerable extent by the personal be-
liefs of the judges. The only key to such personal ideas lies in the
statements made by the various men who have faced this problem in
the past and at least part of whom may be called upon to decide similar
issues in the future. By a comparison of these quotations, some conclu-
sion might be reached as to whether the past and present justices of
the Supreme Court believe religious freedom to be subject to any lim-
itations, and if so, what are the proper limits.
111. Const., Art. 2, § 3: "No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent."
0See text at footnote 15.
"129 N. Y. Misc. 481, 22o N. Y. Supp. 799 (1926).
The school argued that such a regulation was part of their contract with the
parent. The court found that it was not in fact a term of that contract, but would
19461
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Up until the time of the decision in Jones v. Opelika in 1942, there
seems to have been no question in the minds of any of the justices then
on the Supreme Court but that religious freedom was subject to some
limitations. This is illustrated by the following portion of Mr. Justice
Murphy's dissent to that case:
"Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of re-
ligion all have a double aspect-freedom of thought and free-
dom of action. Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature;
.... But even an aggressive mind is of no missionary value un-
less there is freedom of action .... Since in any form of action
there is a possibility of collision with the rights of others, there
can de no doubt that this freedom to act is not absolute but
qualified, being subject to regulation in the public interest which
does not unduly infringe the right."8 6
No statement by any other justice has been found up until that time
which would indicate a contrary opinion concerning the existence of
proper limitations upon religious freedom, but the following year in
a concurring opinion to the Barnette case, Mr. Justice Murphy seems
to have undergone a change of mind:
"But there is before us the right of freedom to believe, freedom
to worship one's Maker according to the dictates of one's con-
science, a right which the Constitution specifically shelters. Re-
flection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier duty
or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its
farthest reaches."3 7
Whether or not Mr. Justice Murphy intended this statement to be
construed as advocating a blanket withdrawal of all restraint it is not
possible to say; however, it is the only statement to be found in any
recent case which might possibly be conceived of as embodying such an
idea.
The other justices who have written majority, concurring, or dis-
senting opinions in connection with the cases included in the scope of
this review all have asserted that there are definite limits beyond
which actions cannot be justified in the name of religious liberty. They
have all indicated in some manner what they believe those proper
limitations to be. These comments are herein set forth without any
effort to classify or group them as to possible interpretation:
1. Justices Black and Douglas, concurring: "No well ordered
be void, even if included, as an infringement of constitutionally guaranteed free-
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society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to make
final decisions, unassailable by the State, as to everything they
will or will not do. The First Amendment does not go so far.
Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from re-
sponsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which are
either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from
grave and pressing dangers or which, without any general pro-
hibition, merely regulate time, place or manner of religious
activity."
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2. Mr. Justice Roberts: "There are limits to the exercise of these
liberties. The danger in these times from the coercive activities
of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would
incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive
others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is
emphasized by events familiar to all. These and other trans-
gressions of those limits the states appropriately may punish."
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3. Mr. Justice Reed: "Believing as this nation has from the first
that the freedoms of worship and expression are closely akin to
the illimitable privileges of thought itself, any legislation af-
fecting those freedoms is scrutinized to see that the interferences
allowed are only those appropriate to the maintenance of a
civilized society."
40
4- Mr. Justice Jackson: "Religious freedom in the long run does
not come from this kind of license to each sect to fix its own
limits, but comes of hard-headed fixing of those limits by neu-
tral authority with an eye to the widest freedom to proselyte
compatible with the freedom of those subject to proselyting
pressures.
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5. Chief Justice Stone: "Concededly the constitutional guaran-
tees of personal liberty are not always absolutes. Government
has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are not
necessarily set at naught by the express prohibitions of the Bill
of Rights. It may make war and raise armies. To that end it may
compel citizens to give military service .... and subject them to
military training despite their religious objections .... It may
suppress religious practices dangerous to morals, and presum-
able those also which are inimical to public safety, health and
good order.. .."4
6. Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "The constitutional protection of
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